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In Code(rs) We Trust 
Software Developers as Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains 
Angela Walch,. 
I. Introduction
'Those who are not expert developers or computer scientists who have invested a great deal of 
time in lea rning the design principles and codebase of a blockchain must place a great deal of 
faith in the expert developer community:' 
'A computer operates only in accordance with the information and directions supplied by its 
human programmers. If the computer does not think like a man, it is man's fault? 
A decade into Bitcoin's existence, governance questions around it and other public 
blockchains abound. Do these 'decentralized' structures even have governance? If so, what 
does it look like? Who has power, and how is it channelled or constrained? Are power struc­
tures implicit or explicit? How can we improve upon the ad hoc governance structures of early 
blockchains? ls 'on-chain governance: like that proposed byTezos and others, the path forward? 
In August 20 I 6, in the aftermath of the DAO theft and resulting Ethereum hard fork, 
I argued in American Banker that the core developers and significant miners of public 
blockchains function as fiduciaries of those who rely on these systems and should, therefore, 
be accountable as such.' The DAO episode provided a gripping real-world demonstration 
that certain people within nominally decentralized public blockchains were malting deci­
sions about other people's money and resources, yet this power was largely unacknowledged, 
undefined, and unaccountable. 
In this chapter, I explore in greater depth my claim that certain developers of public 
blockchains act as fiduciaries,• as events since the DAO continue to point to the exercise of 
power within these systems without corresponding accountability.• With the peer-to-peer 
• This paper was selected for presentation at the 2nd International Work.shop-P2P Financial Systems 2016 at 
UCL on 8 September 2016. I would like to thank Samir Parikh, Aaron Wright, Patrick Murck, Ajit Tripathi, Tim 
Pastoor, Andrew Miller, V1ad Zam fir, Philipp Hacker, Drew Hinkes, Stephen Palley, Tim Swanson, Ciaran Murray, 
participants at the 2015 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Conference New Scholars Program, the 
2017 Blockchain and the Constitution of a New Financial Order: Legal and Political Challenges Conference at UCL. 
faculty work.shops at Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University and Texas A&M Law School. 
the P2P Financial Systems 2016 Workshop, and the active crypto Twitterverse for helpful feedback and insights. 
1 Nick Szabo, 'Money, Blockchains, and Social Scalability' ( Unenumerated, 9 February 2017) https:// 
unenumerated.blogspot.com/2017 /02/money-blockc:hains-and-social-scalability.btml. 
' State Farm Mutual Auto lns. v .  Bockhorst, 453 F 2d 533,537 (10th Cir. 1972). 
• Angela Walch, 'Call Blockchain Developers What They Are: Fiduciaries' (2016) American Banker, https:// 
www.americanbanker.com/opinionJcall-blockr:hain-developers-what-they-are-fi.duciaries. 
4 In this chapter, 'developers' is used as shonhand for those involved in making decisions about the software 
that operates public blockchains. This group may include people who write software code, make decisions about 
policies that should be reAected in software code, review software code, etc. The term excludes miners and other 
nodes in the network that run the software. 
5 The governance of 'private' or 'pennissioned' blockchains deserves its own careful scrutiny but is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Private (i.e. permissioned) blockchains are data structures with a known and trusted group of 
trans.action processors. 'Public' (i.e. 'permission-less') blockchains, like Bitcoin and Ethereum, are data structures 
for which anyone can become a traruaction processor simply by running the applicable software. 
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computer network that operates these data structures through the running of software code, 
governance occurs through the software development and transaction verification pro­
cesses. This chapter focuses on the software development process and compares the role of 
dominant software developers to a general definition of a fiduciary, finding many likenesses 
between the two. Recognizing that significant experimentation in governance is ongoing 
with public blockchains, I provide an initial outline of the core issues and questions raised 
by the fiduciary categorization.• 
The age-old fiduciary concept may initially seem a poor fit for cutting-edge public 
blockchains, which are celebrated for enabling human coordination without the need to 
trust in a central party.' Indeed, the adjective 'trust/ess' is still regularly applied to these sys­
tems.• By contrast, the fiduciary concept is based fully on trust, one party entrusting another 
to make decisions on her behalf. Applying the fiduciary construct to public blockchains 
thus emphasizes that-even in public blockchains-we have not escaped the need to trust in 
other humans. Though some in the public blockchain space describe these systems as 'trust­
minimized',' I see them as 'trust-shifting'; the need to trust in others has simply moved from 
its traditional place (e.g. the officers and directors of a bona fide corporation), leaving us to 
discern where it has landed. In these systems that operate money, smart contracts, and po­
tentially many other critical human practices, people continue to lead and make important 
decisions on behalf of others; we just have to name them and decide how to treat them. 
Understanding public blockchain governance is not merely an academic matter. Accurately 
describing the roles that various parties play in the governance of blockchain systems has 
implications for many different legal analyses related to these systems. A single important 
example is the application of securities laws to public blockchain systems. '0 If we do not 
press past a superficial description of public blockchain systems as 'decentralized: then we 
do not perceive the important decision makers within these systems, who wield significant 
power throughout the life of the blockchain. 
In a broader sense, blockchain technology is being lauded as transformative for every 
human practice that uses recordkeeping (so, all of them). If blockchain technology achieves 
even a small portion of its projected potential, then it may soon undergird many critical 
infrastructures within our societies, ranging from property records, to payment and voting 
systems. And, if blockchain technology ends up enabling our most fundamental social in­
frastructures, then the governance processes for creating, maintaining, and altering the tech­
nology deserve careful scrutiny, as these processes will affect the resilience of the technology 
as well as any infrastructure that comes to rely on it.11 
• In addition to developers, there are other parties who play important roles in a public blockchain system, 
including miners (transaction processors), nodes (those that do not actually process transactions), users, and 
exchanges (businesses that exchange one cryptocurrency for another cryptocurrency or a traditional sovereign 
currency like the US dollar). See, e.g .. Jatinder Singh and Johan David Michel,. ·elockchain as a Service: Providers 
and Trust' (2017) Queen Mary, University ofLondon, School of Law Legal S1udies Research Paper No. 269/2017, 
https://ssm.com/abstract=3091223. I plan to anaJyse the governance roles of these parties in later papers. 
' Primavera De: Filippi and Aaron Wright, Blodu:hain and the Law: The Rule of Code (Harvard University Press 
2018), 2-3. 
' ibid., 26. 
• NickSz.abo, 'The: DawnofTrustwonhyComputing' (Unenumerated. l l December 2014), http://unenumerated. 
blog,pot.com/2014/ 12/the-dawn-of-trustworthy-computing.hi ml. 
10 Securities regulators around the world are evaJuating how the tokens of blockchain systems fit into existing 
securities laws, with a number of prosecution.s .stemming from the initial coin offering mania that struck the 
cryptocurrency world in 2017. On 14 June 2018, a representative of the US Securitie.s and Exchange Commission 
.stated that it wa.s unliktly that Bitcoin or Ethereum were securities due to their decentralized .status because 'pur­
cha.ser.s would no longer rea.sonably expect a per.son or group to carry out e:.s.sential managerial or entrepreneurial 
elfons'. Speech by Wllliam Hinman, 'Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Mel Gary (Plastic)' (14 June 2018) 
Speech, hnps://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman •0614 I 8. 
11 Angela Walch, 'The Bitcoin Block.chain a.s Financial Market Infrastructure: A Con.sideration of Operational 
Risk' (2015) 18 New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 83, consider.s the operational risks 
created by informal governance processe.s in Bitcoin and their implications for its suitabiHty as financial market in­
frastructure, Angela Wakh, 'Open-Source Operational Risk,; Should Public Block.chains Serve as Financial Market 
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In section II, I describe the types of activities that software developers perform and ex­
plain how these activities function as a significant part of the governance of prominent 
public blockchains, like Bitcoin and Ethereum. 12 In section III, I evaluate the implications 
of this concentration of power in certain developers and apply Tamar Frankel's conception 
of a 'fiduciary' to their actions. In section IV, I discuss the pros and cons of treating these 
parties as fiduciaries of certain participants in the blockchains they manage. In section V, 
I discuss some of the complexities involved with the categorization, including the difficul­
ties in precisely determining which individuals in a given blockchain function as fiduciaries 
and to whom they should owe corresponding duties. In section VI, I provide an overview of 
the continuing experimentation in public blockchain governance and of existing scholarly 
approaches. Finally, in section VII, I offer concluding thoughts and suggestions for further 
research. 
As I perform this analysis, I am aware that analogizing software developers to fiduciaries 
is controversial, as treating these parties as fiduciaries directly contests the dominant narra­
tive of decentralization of public blockchains and would almost certainly reduce innovation 
in the public blockchain space. However, sometimes consideration of taboo ideas is neces­
sary to illuminate the trade-offs we make in our existing legal paradigm of protecting innov­
ation by minimizing accountability. A discussion of the accountability of those who govern 
technology is particularly salient given the current, active debate over the governance of 
Facebook, I.Jber, and other technology companies that have significant effects on society. 
II. Nominal Decentralization-De Facto Governance
In this section, I describe the role developers play in the governance of certain public 
blockchains and explore public blockchains' overstated reputation for decentralized soft­
\\'are development, given that identifiable parties dominate (and therefore centralize) the 
process.u 
One of the defining features of public blockchains is that they are said to be decentralized." 
In theory, this means that there is no central entity that either creates or maintains them. 15 
Rather, they operate on a peer-to-peer basis through the running of open-source software 
by a network of computers. The software development process for public blockchains is also 
said to be 'decentralized: as is typical of open-source software projects.•• There is no cen­
tral entity that is officially responsible for maintaining or updating the software. A mix of 
Infrast.ructu.re5?' in Handbook of Bladcchain, Digital Finance, and lnclwion, edited by David Lee Kuo Chuen and 
Robert Deng (Vol 2, Elsevier Academic Press 2017), explores the operational risks raised by the use of grassroots 
open-source so�-are dn-elopment practic� in the use of public blockchains as 6.nancia.1 market infra.structures. 
n Each public blockr:hain has its own unique characteristics, so it is theoretically possible that some public 
�ncJr!'.;b::iin" may not h3\·e sofh.-..re developers who serve as fiduciaries. However, I am sceptical that the elimin­
ation of trusted SD�--ue de\-"?lopers will acrually occur, so believe the analysis in this chapter \\>ill be useful to the 
underst2.nding of most, if not all, public block.chains. 
u A great deal of experimentation is happening with public block.chains, 'o\'lth new variations introduced al­
most d.2.ily. This chapter does not specifically address each variation of governance but provides an overarching 
ana}�1..ical fra.mn.-ork. I highlight some recent variations of public blockchain governance in Part VJ. It may be 
possible that new ,ilriations of public blockch.a.i..ru have no developers filling the role of fiduciaries, but I am 
=pucal th.at thi., will be the case. 
u Adam E Gencer, Soumya Basu, Inay Eyal, Robbert van renesse, and Emin G. Sirer, 'Decentralization in 
Bitcoin and Ethereum Setworks (arXiv.o,x, 2018) https:l/arxiv.orglpdf/1801.03998.pdf.; Peter van Valkenburgh, 
"Whal Could "Dea,ntralization" Mean in the Conten of the Law!' (CoinCentreBlog, 15 June 2018) hnps;// 
coinunter.org/entry/wbat-cou.ld-decentralization-mean-in-the-context-of-the-law. 
11 Gene.er (n 14). The mining ne�·ork.s of public blockchains, like Bitcoin and Ethereum, are quite centralized, 
w:b.ich i.!; relevant 10 the go,•ernance role miners play in these networks. More extensive discussion of this phenom­
enon is be,·ood the scope of this chapter. 
u For � discu5sion of the software development process of public block.chains, see Walch, 'Open-Source 
Operational Rwc" (D 11), 252-54. 
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volunteer and paid software developers write and update the software, determining how to 
revise the code through ' informal processes that depend on rough notions of consensus and 
that are subject to no fixed legal or organizational structure'. 17 The code is publicly avail­
able, 11 and anyone in the world may propose a change through a standardized proposal pro­
cess. Indeed, many developers from across the globe have made proposals. 
Furthermore, there may be people involved who help shape the code but do not actually 
write it-these may include people reviewing it or doing research and making recommenda­
tions about the policy and technical goals of the system. As mentioned earlier in footnote 4, 
my use of the term 'developer' in this analysis is intended to encompass those making deci­
sions about the policy choices to be embedded in the code, how best technically to manifest 
those choices, and then actually crafting and reviewing the code to achieve those policy and 
technical choices. Within this group of contributors, importantly, not all participants are 
equal. For instance, in open-source software projects like public blockchains, a team of 'core 
developers' or 'maintainers' generally leads the software development process. This means 
that, although this group of people may not be w,ited under the roof of an entity struc­
ture, they function as the leaders and decision makers in relation to the code." This power 
manifests in the ways in which they differ from rank-and-file developers. With Bitcoin, for 
example, core developers, w,til recently, have had the ability to send emergency messages 
to all nodes in the network'" and are the only developers who have 'commit access' that 
allow them to make actual changes to the software code,2' i.e. other developers can pro­
pose changes but a core developer's password or access code is ultimately needed to put 
that change in a new code release. Prominent developers also shape how public blockchains 
are viewed by regulators and the public at large. Certain developers have met privately with 
various international regulators or leaders" and often comment publicly on what should 
happen with the particular blockchain they represent and the technology as a whole. n 
" Shawn Bayern, 'Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software and the Zero-Member LLC' (2014) 108 
Northwestern University Law Review o,.u,..e, 257, 259. 
11 lhe GitHub pages for Bitcoin and Ethereum, the two most prominent public block.chains, are found at 
https://gir.hub.com/bitcoin/bitcoin and https://github.com/ethereum/, respectively. 11 VitaJik Buterin, creator of Ethereum, stated in a January 2017 interview about Ethereum's governance: 'It is 
kind of technocratic in some ways, because right now there i.5 a smaU group of people that rully deeply under­
stand alJ the different Ethereum technical considerations-a lot of decisions do tend to get made by a small group. 
But in the longer term that is definitely something we are looking to democratize.' This statement is from Joan 
Ian Wong, 'Ethereum's Inventor on How .. Initial Coin Offerings" are a New Way to Fund the Internet' (Quartz, 
14 September 2017), Interview with Viterik Buterin, hrtps://qz.com/1075 I 24/ethereum-founder-vitatik-buterin­
discusses-initial-coin-offerings-the-consensus-algorithm-and-the-most-interesting-apps/. 10 Andreas M Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin: Unlocking Digital Cryptocurrencie..s (2nd edn, O'Reilly 2017), 
157: the emergency message power 'allow[ed] the core developer team to notify all Bitcoin users of a serious 
problem in the Bitcoin network, such as a critical bug that require[s] user action: The password that allowed 
the sending of the network-wide emergency messages was held onJy 'by a few select members of the core devel­
opment team'. AJso sre Arthur Gervais, Ghassan 0. Ka.tame, Srdjan Capkun, and Vedran Capkun, 'Is Bitcoin a 
Decentralized Currency?' (2014) http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/829.pdf, which argues that giv;ng the emergency alert 
power only to the core developers 'gives these entities privileged powers to reach out to users and urge them to 
adopt a given Bitcoin release'. 
" Tom Simonite, 'The Man Who ReaUy Built Bitcoin' (2014) MIT Technology Review, http://www. 
technologyreview.com/featucedstory/527051/the-man-who-really-built-bitcoin/, describes how only the core de­
velopers have the power to 'change the code behind Bitcoin and merge in proposals from other volunteers: Also 
see Gervais et al. (n 20), 6: 'this !software development process] limits the impact that users have, irrespective of 
their computing power, to affect the development of the official Bitcoin lsoftwarer 
]] For example, Gavin Andresen met with the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States when he 
served as the lead developer of Bitcoin in 2011. Vitali.k Buterin, the creator of Ethereum, met with Rus.sian 
president Vladimir Putin in 2017 u sourced from IJya Khrennikov, 'Vladimir Putin is Getting Interested 
In Bitcoin's Biggest Rival" (Bloomberg, 6 June 2017) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017•06-06/ 
putin-eyes•bitcoin-rival-to-spur-economic-growth-beyond-oil-gas. 
u Quoting of Bitcoin core developer Wladirnir van der Laan on plans for funding Bitcoin software development 
found in Stan Higgins, 'Bitcoin Core Opens Doors to Outside Funding with Sponsorship Program' (CoinDesk, 6 
April 2016) http:/ /www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-core-open.s•doors •to-outside• funding-with-sponsorship· progrun/; 
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Power is often most visible during a crisis and examining what has happened in crisis 
moments of public blockchains shows us the power that a small group of developers 
wields. Below, I briefly describe Bitcoin's March 2013 hard fork and Ethereum's July 
2016 hard fork. A 'hard fork' occurs when at least two non-compatible versions of soft­
ware are running on a network, meaning that different ledgers are being generated by 
different portions of a previously cohesive network.>< Hard forks are significant mo­
ments in public blockchains as they result in two separate networks; if the hard fork is 
unintentional, it can require human discretion and action for the networks (and their 
ledgers) to reunite!' 
A. Bitcoin's March 2013 hard fork
In March 2013, Bitcoin experienced a hard fork in the network, with the effect that two 
separate ledgers were being maintained by different computers within the network.2° The 
fork happened because nodes within the network were running two different versions of 
the Bitcoin software; some had upgraded to a new release whilst others had not yet done so. 
When the software developers realized that the fork was occurring, they quickly contacted 
miners on the network to persuade them to support one of the two disparate ledgers. 1his re­
quired some of the miners to downgrade to the prior software version, 'sacrificing significant 
amounts of money' as a result. 27 With that change made, the network gradually returned to 
a single ledger. 
1his episode spotlights the exercise of power by both the key developers and miners with 
a significant amount of hashing power. The developers were able to correspond with, and 
persuade, particular miners to alter the software they were running, which had the effect 
of creating a 'winning' ledger. The developers involved also chose which ledger should be 
authoritative; this created financial winners and losers amongst the miners, based on which 
ledger fragment they had been processing during the fork. Miners with a threshold per­
centage of power within the network were able to sway the outcome through their choice of 
which version of the software to run. The more network power, essentially, the more 'votes' 
a miner could cast, and the more lobbying required by developers to obtain the result they 
sought. 
B. Ethereum's July 2016 hard fork
The Ethereum blockchain faced an existential crisis in the summer of2016 when the DAO, an 
application built on top of its blockchain platform, suffered a $50+ million theft. 28 Presented 
with the choice of allowing the thief to keep the stolen ether to preserve the ledger's 'immut­
ability' or to craft new code that would reverse the objectionable transactions, the Ethereum 
transcribing of an interview with Yitalik Buterin about public blockchain governance and funding found in Wong 
(n 19). 
24 A 'hard fork' (i.e. a split into more than one network) can result from the use of incompatible software 
by different ponions of a public blockchain network. whereas a 'soft fork' results from the release of new soft­
ware to the network that is compatible with prior versions so that the network continues to produce a single 
blockchain record. Bruno Biais, Christophe Bisi('re, Matthieu Bouvard, and Catherine Casamatta, 'The Blockchain 
Folk Theorem' (2018) Toulouse School of Economic., Working Paper No. 17-817, 14, https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/ 
default/filesrTSE/documents/doclwp/2017 /wp_t,e_Sl 7.pdf. 
" For a more in-depth di,cus,ion of hard forks of public blockchain,, ,ee Walch, 'Open-Source Operational 
Ri,k' (n 11), 259-66; Biais et al. (n 24), 13-17. 
" Walch, 'Toe Bitcoin Blockchain as FM!' (n 11), 873; Biais (n 24), 14-16. 
27 Walch, 'The Bitcoin Blockchain as FM!' (n 11), 873. 
,. Joon Ian Wong and Ian Kar, 'Everything You Need to Know About the Ethereum "Hard Fork"' (Quartz, 18 
July 2016) https://qz.com/730004/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-ethereum-hard-fork/. 
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developers decided to pursue a hard fork that would recover the funds.,. They determined 
how to code revised software that would achieve the fork as well as persuaded a majority of 
the network's hashing power (held and exercised by miners) to adopt the revised software. 
The preparations for the hard fork included explanatory missives from the core developers 
and an advance poll of the Ethereum miners to see how likely the hard fork was to succeed.10 
Only a very small percentage of ether holders or miners voted in the advance polls but the 
Ethereum developers decided to proceed with the hard fork." 
It worked. Enough miners upgraded to the revised software, and the ledger followed 
them, taking the Ethereum name and primary developers with it. However, a splinter 
group of software developers and miners decided to keep the original ledger (reflecting 
the theft) going. Dubbing the surviving chain 'Ethereum Classic', this group issued a 
Declaration of Independence from Ethereum" and has since been operating a com­
peting blockchain. 
This hard fork demonstrates the power exercised by certain developers and significant 
miners. The developers made the decision whether to treat the hack of the DAO application 
as theft (meaning that it should have some sort of remedy) or as an exploitation of code 
intended to run without human involvement (meaning no remedy would be appropriate). 
The proposal to engage in the hard fork split the Ethereum community, with some arguing 
passionately for immutability no matter what, and others arguing that the hacker must be 
punished. Allegations that the dominant developers recommended the hard fork because 
some of their own money had been stolen in the hack" made the rounds on Twitter and 
Reddit.34 
The passion, drama, and anger surrounding the Ethereum hard fork show how much was 
at stake for the Ethereum community, for investors in ether, and for those who built appli­
cations and companies atop the Ethereum blockchain. Yet only a small number of devel­
opers and miners in this 'decentralized' system decided what the resolution of the DAO hack 
would be, in effect determining the financial fortunes of all those relying on the Ethereum 
blockchain, whether or not they had invested in the DAO." 
These examples of power reveal that centralized decision making exists within nominally 
decentralized public blockchains.,. There are countless other examples demonstrating the 
exercise of power by a small subset of developers-arguably every single bit of code actually 
2' ibid. 1t.1 ibid. 
" Vitalik Buterin, 'Notes on Blockchain Governance' (Vitalik Buterin's website, l 7 December 2017) https:/1 
vitali.k.ca/general/2017 I 12/ I 7 /voting.html 
n Ethereum Classic, 'The Ethereum Classic Declaration of Independence, 20 July 2016: https://ethereumclassic. 
github.io/assets/ETC_Declaration_of_lndependence.pdf. 
" Ray Jones, 'Ethereum Protocol Developer Holds SI 14,877 Worth of DAO Tokens' {Reddit, 29 June 2016) 
https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4qiqq8/et.hereum_protocol_developer_holds_l l4877 _worth_of/ 
d4th8ce/: 'The simplest solution would be for aU people in positions of influence who are in favor of a hard fork 
to openly declare their DAO token holdings: Aakil Fernandes, 'Ethereum Protocol Developer Holds St 14,887 of 
DAO Tokens' (Reddit, 29 June 2016) https://www.reddi1.com/r/ether•umlcomments/4qiqq8/ethereum_protocol_ 
developer _holds_ 114877 _ worth_of/d4tm9o5/: 'We Jhould care when people have conflicts of interest. That applies 
to lawyers. judges. bankers, politicians and yes it applies to developers. Humans are humans.' 
u See, e.g., Justin Camarena, 'l<I agree with a rollback for protocol level hacks . .. But this isn't that at all. 
Core devs own DAO' {Twitter, 17 June 2016) hnps://twitter.com/ju,camarena/status/744008754459475968; Justin 
Camarena, 'they are unfairly slanted to HF'ing ta rega.in their money ... might as well just have a private chain' 
{Twitter. 17 June 2016) https,//twiner.com/juscamarena/status/74400886309 I 941376; Fernandes {n 33). 
11 A counter-argument to the argument that Ethereum developers and miners exercised power is that parties 
who did not wish to proceed were able to continue with the Ethereum Classic block.chain. However, Ethereum 
Classic had much less mining power devoted to it, making it more vulnerable to attack. and it had to assemble a 
new slate of software developers to keep it going. 
u Some may argue that these examples of power exercised in connection with a hard fork are no longer relevant 
because they happened in 2013 and 2016, respectively. However, nothing relevant appears to have changed about 
the software development governance models in Bitcoin or Ethereum since these events. 
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released to the network is an exercise of power. Since the moment these public blockchains 
were created (including the idea development and creation process), small groups of people 
have been making decisions about which policies should be reflected in the code (e.g. a 
limited or unlimited number of tokens? Transaction fees or the creation of new tokens?) 
and how those policy choices should technically be achieved through the code. These deci­
sions have impacted upon significant numbers of people, and the more widely used public 
blockchains become, whether as cryptocurrencies or as infrastructure undergirding other 
systems, the greater will be the number of people who rely on the decision making of a small 
set of developers. 
III. If It Looks Like a Fiduciary ...
In section I, I described how developers exercise power within public blockchains. In this 
section, I explore the implications of this concentration of power and analogize these central 
decision makers to fiduciaries." When using a general definition of'fiduciary', certain devel­
opers of public blockchains bear a strong resemblance.38 
The fiduciary concept is ancient and is fundamentally based on the concept of 'trust'. 
Familiar fiduciaries include doctors, lawyers, financial advisors, trustees, and corporate of­
ficers and directors." We frequently put our fate in the hands of others-others whom we 
count on to provide considered and competent advice, perform tasks we cannot do for our­
selves (like open-heart surgery!) and to manage our funds or investments to our benefit. We 
expect these parties to put our interests before their own in this role and to perform their 
duties competently and honestly. 
Tamar Frankel, the pioneering and leading scholar on fiduciary law, has written that all 
fiduciaries share the following attributes: 
I) They offer mainly services (in contrast to products). The services that fiduciaries offer are 
usually socially desirable and often require expertise, such as healing, legal services, leaching, 
asset management, corporate management and religious services. 2) In order to perform these 
services effectively, fiduciaries must be entrusted with property or power. 3) Entrustment poses 
to 'entrustors' the risks that the fiduciaries will not be trustworthy. They may misappropriate the 
entrusted property, misuse the entrusted power or they will not perform the promised services 
adequately. 4) There is a likelihood that [a] the entruslor will fail to protect itself from the risks 
involved in fiduciary relationships; [bl the markets may fail to protect entrustors from these 
risks; and that [ c] the costs for the fiduciaries of establishing their trustworthiness may be higher 
than their benefits from the relationships.•• 
Certain developers of public blockchains arguably resemble fiduciaries in all of the ways 
identified by Frankel. Below, I apply each of Frankel's factors in turn. 
n Szabo, ' Money Blockchains' (n I), analogized miners to fiduciaries and noted the significant trust placed in 
blockchain software developers: 'Miners are partially trusted fiduciaries, and those who are not expert developers 
or computer scientists who have invested a great deal of time in learning the design principles and codebase of a 
blockchain must place a great deaJ of faith in the expert developer community, much as non-specialists who want 
to understand the results of a speciaHzed science do of the corresponding scientists.' 
>1 1his is not a jurisdiction-specific legal argument, but rather a consideration of the broad conception of a 
fiduciary. l am not claiming that in a panicular jurisdiction, the core developers or dominant miners would be 
considered fiduciaries based oa that jurisdiction's existing law. 
n In recent years, legal scholars have examined whether expansion of the fiduciary category may be merited, 
including in the technology sector. See, e.g., Jack M Balkin, 'Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment' 
(2016) 49 Univer-Jity of California DaviJ Law Review, l 183, who argues that tech companies holding personal data 
should be deemed 'information fiduciaries: D. Theodore Rave, 'Politicians as Fiduciaries' (2013) 126 Harvard 
Law. Review67 l argues that politicians function as fiduciaries. Bhan Leib, David L Ponet, and Michael Serota, '.A 
Fiduciary Theory of)udging' (2013) 101 California Law Review, 699, apply the fiduciary concept to judges. 
"0 Tamar Frank.el, Fiduciary Law (Oxford University Press 2011), 6. 
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A. Providing socially desirable services that often require expertise
Frankel's first factor is that fiduciaries provide services (as opposed to products) to the 
'entrust ors•• 1 and that the services are typically 'socially desirable' and 'often require expertise'. 
As described in section I, the software developers who work on public blockchains pro­
vide services to the users of that blockchain. These services include conducting research, re­
viewing the code, proposing conceptual changes to the code, reviewing changes proposed by 
other developers, drafting new code and revising existing code, security-testing new code, 
compiling code into new releases, and communicating about the project with other devel­
opers. There is certainly a conceptual question as to whether software code is a 'product: 42 
but it is common practice that when companies license software to other parties, they can 
choose whether or not to provide the service (sold under a services or maintenance agree­
ment) of ongoing software maintenance. While one could argue that the software itself is a 
product, the work that the developers do to maintain and change it is a service. 
Furthermore, one could certainly argue (and I imagine that all software developers 
working on these blockchains would agree or they would not be working on these projects) 
that the services provided are 'socially desirable'. If one believes that public blockchains offer 
some benefits to the public or to their users, then the services performed to create and main­
tain them are arguably 'socially desirable'. In addition, the services provided by the software 
developers clearly 'require expertise'. Only those skilled in designing, reading, evaluating, 
and crafting software code can perform these services. Although the project is open-source, 
which typically means that the development process is open to anyone who wants to con­
tribute, only developers who have at least a minimum amount of expertise in the relevant 
software languages and design techniques can realistically participate. And, only those who 
have earned the privilege of 'commit access' have the privilege of making changes to the 
actual code that will be released for use in the system. 
B. Entrusted with property or power 
According to Frankel, the second hallmark of a fiduciary is the ability to use his or her dis­
cretion on behalf of entrustors, as 'fiduciaries must be entrusted with property or power'. 0 
Developers exercise discretion on behalf of others in virtually every task they perform 
in connection with their blockchains. From decisions about which changes should be put 
into a new software release (reflecting both policy and technical choices) to decisions about 
the stance to take when speaking to regulators on behalf of the blockchain, developers are 
constantly making impactful choices. 44 In the 2013 Bitcoin hard fork, leading developers de­
termined which of the forked ledgers should be recognized as true and persuaded particular 
miners to achieve their goals. In the 2016 Ethereum hard fork, key developers decided to 
treat the DAO hack as a theft and to reverse the transaction by issuing a new release of the 
code. In each of these cases, based on the developers' decisions, some people lost money. 
Holders of public blockchain tokens and those who built businesses on top of these public 
blockchains did not get to explicitly approve these decisions45-once they chose to partici­
pate in the blockchain, the only way to escape the developers' power would be to abandon 
.-i ibid., Introduction. I use Frankel's terminology, which she uses to refer to those whom fiduciaries serve: 'they 
entrust to fiduciaries property and power'. 
" See David Berke, 'Products Liability in the Sharing Economy" (2016) 33 Yale Journal on Regulation, 609-18, 
which provides a recent description of the legal status of software as a product for products liability purposes. 
" Frankel (n 40), 6 and 26. 
""' Note that some of the variations on public blockchain governance described in Part V incorporate 'on-chain' 
governance (e.g. Tezos), which provides for holders of the applicable token to vote on software changes. This may 
not affect the fiduciary analysis as any voter who is not an expert in the relevant technology or code will likely rely 
on the recommendations of an expert to cast a vote. 0 ibid. 
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the investment (whether in the cryptocurrency or the blockchain-related business) or to 
persuade a group of people to create a new token by forking off the original blockchain (as 
happened with Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Gold in 2017).•• Unfortunately, the developers' 
decisions could reduce the value of an investment in the blockchain to zero before an in­
vestor is able to get out (by selling the cryptocurrency to a willing buyer). Much is made 
of token-holders' 'right to exit' via the forking process or selling the token;" however, the 
ability to exit should not be relevant to the fiduciary analysis-shareholders of publicly re­
gistered stock can always exit by selling the stock, yet they are still owed fiduciary duties by 
officers and directors of the company. 
One could also argue that developers are in some ways entrusted with property, given the 
trend to view cryptocurrency tokens as commodities or digital assets. u Developers are es­
sential to maintaining the existence of these digital assets-if they mess up the coding (delib­
erately or unintentionally), the digital asset could cease to exist, analogous to what happened 
with the famous Parity bug in 2017, when millions of dollars of the cryptocurrency ether be­
came inaccessible. 0 In this way, developers are important caretakers of other people's money. 
C. Risk to entrustors that fiduciaries may not be trustworthy 
Frankel's third indicator of a fiduciary is that 'entrustment poses to entrustors the risks that 
the fiduciaries will not be trustworthy. They may misappropriate the entrusted property, 
misuse the entrusted power or they will not perform the promised services adequately:•• 
lhis factor deals with both trustworthiness (the possibility of exploitation by the fiduciary) 
and competence (performing the promised service to an acceptable standard). 
There are many ways in which developers could exploit their positions or fail to act with 
competence, in both cases harming those who rely on the relevant blockchain. 
As with any position of power, conflict-of-interest situations can and do arise for key devel­
opers. These crop up most obviously with their compensation. Although open-source soft­
ware is generally developed by software developers in their spare time as an unpaid hobby, 
the public blockchains of Bitcoin and Ethereum have worked differently. Keeping multi­
billion-dollar systems working 24/7 is too demanding for hobbyists, so people involved with 
Bitcoin and Ethereum have found ways of paying important developers for their time. With 
Ethereum, a Swiss non-profit company called the 'Ethereum Foundation' was created and 
crowd-funded through the first initial coin offering ('!CO'), and pays for the salaries of some 
developers, along with other administrative and advisory staff." With Bitcoin, there have 
.u Recent 5 J % attacks against Bitcoin Gold, a forked network from the original Bitcoin chain, demonstrate that a forked 
network may have different (in this contat, lesser) properties than the original network. induding potentially less security 
if it has le.ss mining power devoted to it or less experienced software developers. See Daniel Oberhaus, 'Cryptocurrency 
Miners are Sabotaging Blockchain.s for Their Personal Gain" (Motherboard. 25 May 2018) https://motherboard.vice. 
com/en_ us/article/a3a38e/what-is-a-51-percent-attack-silicon-valley-bitcoin-gold-verge-monacoin-cryptocurrency. 
47 E.g. Jeffery Atik and George Gerro, 'Hard Forks on the Bitcoin Blockchain: Reversible Exit, Continuing 
Voice" (2018) I Stanford Journal of Law and Public Policy, analyse the availability of shareholder concepts of voice 
and a.it in hard forks of the Bit coin block.chain. 
" See In re Co,nf/ip Inc .• CFTC Doc.ker No. 15-29 ( 17 September 2015): Commodity Futures Trading Commis5ion 
v. McDonnell, F. Supp.3d 213 (E.D. NY) (2018): Chris Bu.rniske and Jack Tatar, Cryptoas,ets: The Innovative 
lnvestor5 Guick to Bitcoin and &yand (McGraw-Hill 2018). 
41 See Giuseppe Destefanis, Michele Marchesi, Marco Ortu et al., 'Smart Contracts Vulnerabilities: A Call 
for Block.chain Software Engineering' (2018) IEEE Conference paper, http://dspace.stir.ac.uk/bitstrearn/1893/ 
27135/1/smart-contracts-vulnerabilities-3.pdf, which conducts a case study of the Parity wallet hack and pro­
poses a special category of 'Block.chain Soltware Engineering' with higher standards than non-blockchain software 
development. 
" Frankel (n 40). 6. 
51 See Joseph Young, 'Vlad Zam.fir: Sharding is the OnJy True Blockchain Scaling Solution' (BinaryDistrict, 13 
November 2017) https:/ /journal. binarydistrict.com/vlad-zamfir-sharding-is-the-only-true-blockchain-scaling­
solution-/: 'Although initial coin offerings (ICOs) and independent blockchain projects have created many mil­
lioIW.Je Ethereum developers, Zamfu explained that most Ethereum core developers earn salaries that are much 
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been a variety of ways of compensating the core developers, including having them work at 
the MIT Media Lab, for private companies within the Bitcoin ecosystem (e.g. Blockstream, 
Bit Pay), and/or under a sponsorship model. 52 
As I have previously argued," this compensation structure sets up a clear conlHct of 
interest for developers, who may feel pressured to make decisions about the blockchain that 
favour their salary payer's interests. A quick scan of Twitter, Reddit, or any blockchain mes­
sage board reveals that there are vastly different opinions on virtually every decision that a 
developer might make, meaning that conlHcts of interest among the key developers are rele­
vant to anyone relying on the applicable blockchain. 
This is not purely hypothetical. Leading developers have been accused of being improp­
erly influenced by those who pay their salaries" or by their own financial interests." A risk 
of exploitation of the position could also arise through key developers' interactions with 
regulators or policy makers on behalf of the blockchain. For instance, Ethereum founder 
Vitalik Buterin famously met with Vladimir Putin and Gavin Andresen met with the Central 
Intelligence Agency/Federal Bureau of Investigation when he was the leading core developer 
of Bitcoin." Meetings with regulators or policy makers may nol be open to the public, so 
users of the blockchain must simply trust that the developers are acting in users' interests 
rather than their own in these meetings. 
There are infinite ways in which key developers could fail to act with competence on be­
half of those who rely on the blockchain. A few quick examples include failing to discover 
and fix a security flaw in the code, misjudging the risks of a proposed change to the software, 
or acting in a way that causes regulators to lose faith in the blockchain, all of which could 
seriously damage those relying on the blockchain. 
It is clear that users of blockchain tokens and any financial products based on them, as 
weU as those building businesses in connection with a blockchain, are vulnerable to both 
untrustworthiness and lack of competence by key developers, particularly those users who 
do �ot have expertise in blockchain software development. 
D. Difficulty or failure of entrustors to protect themselves 
from fiduciary risks
Frankel's fourth characteristic of fiduciaries is: 
there is likelihood that [a] the entrustor will fail to protect itself from the risks involved in fidu­
ciary relationships; [b] the markets may fail to protect entrustors from these risks; and that [c] 
the costs for the fiduciaries of establishing their trustworthiness may be higher than their bene­
fits from the relationships." 
This factor deals with the vulnerability of entrustors to fiduciaries and the likelihood that 
neither they nor markets will provide protection from this vulnerability. 
It is likely that in public blockchains, certain entrustors will fail to protect themselves from 
the risks involved in a fiduciary relationship with developers. This is due to the expertise 
lower than the market standard. •1 agree with 1he genen:I statement that core developers are not sufficiently incen­
tivized� he noted. "'Some Ethereum developers are paid by the Ethereum foundation, but at what are now below 
market salaries. I think core developers provide a huge amount of va1ue as a public good", added Zamfir. "'Public 
goads are inherently difficult to fund, because the nan-ududable nature of their benefits means that even those 
who don"t pay get to enjoy the benefits."' 
" Walch, 'The Bitcoin Blockchain as FM!' (n 11 ), 878-79. " ibid. 
54 See, e.s,, WhalecalJs, 'Fact or FUD: Block.stream, Inc. is the Main Force Behind Bitcoin (and Taken Over)' 
(Medium, 1 December 2017) https://medium.com/@whalecalls/fud-or-fact-blockstream-inc-is-the-main-force­
behind-bitcoin-and-taken-over-160aed93c003, discusses the common statement that the company Block.stream 
controls Bitcoin software development because it employs several care developers. 
" See nn 33 and 34. " See n 22. " Frankel (n 40), 6. 
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barrier between blockchain software developers and users who cannot evaluate software code 
themselves. In 'permissionless' systems like public blockchains, there is nothing that pre­
vents people who lack sofuvare expertise from becoming involved with a given blockchain, 
whether through the purchase of tokens or token-based financial products, or by investing 
in or creating a business tied to the blockchain. Anyone who lacks expertise in the particular 
code of the blockchain (some of which are coded in newly developed sofuvare languages like 
0Caml)58 will have a difficult time protecting themselves from the actions of developers, as 
they are unable to meaningfully evaluate the software code and any proposed changes to it. 
They simply have to count on the developers to make good policy and technical decisions. 
The counter-argument to this is that if non-technical people want to use public blockchains, 
they should be willing to pay to have the code vetted and warrantied for them or accept that 
any use of the blockchain is caveat emptor. This may be somewhat persuasive when talking 
about direct purchasers of public blockchain tokens but is unpersuasive in the case of public 
blockchains serving as infrastructure, when people do not have a meaningful choice about 
their reliance on the blockchain. It is also impractical for entrustors to vet the loyalty and 
character of each influential developer of a public blockchain in order to evaluate whether 
they have a conflict of interest on certain issues. 
Furthermore, 'fiduciaries that serve numerous entrustors in a standardized manner [ as 
is the case with developers of public blockchains] acquire power that is greater than the 
power of fiduciaries that serve individuals'. 59 1his is true in public blockchains because the 
decisions and actions of developers affect an entire blockchain system, rather than a single 
person. Moreover, 'the entrustors' ability to control their fiduciaries is weakened with the 
rise in the entrustors' number. The entrustors may not be well organized and may have dif­
ferent interests and different ideas about the benefits that their fiduciaries must pursue:•• 
1his manifests in public blockchains as entrustors ( token holders, businesses providing 
blockchain-related services, and systems building atop a blockchain) have extremely diver­
gent views on the decisions and actions developers should take, which may dilute the control 
they exercise over developers. 
There are arguments on both sides as to whether the market is likely to protect entrustors 
from the risks involved in trusting developers. One could argue that users of tokens who can 
evaluate software code will serve as market guidance to the entrustors who cannot evaluate 
code, as code-savvy people will signal their belief in the software code quality and the phil­
osophy embedded in it by using the applicable token, or by building businesses related to 
the token. If tech-savvy people do not believe in the quality of the developers or their code, 
they will avoid a particular blockchain and non-tech-savvy people will pick up on these sig­
nals and also avoid that blockchain. Unfortunately, however, this argument seems to have 
been disproven by events in the cryptocurrency and ICO space in 2017-2018. Investors have 
poured billions into ICOs, though in many cases, little detail has been provided on the tech­
nology or the development team behind the technology."' Despite warnings from numerous 
regulators and policy makers, many scams have occurred, suggesting that market signals 
may not enable entrustors to responsibly evaluate a public blockchain and its developers.62 
Finally, the costs for software developers serving as fiduciaries of establishing their 
trustworthiness may be higher than their benefits from the relationship. lhis may be par­
ticularly true in public blockchains that rely on grassroots open-source software govern­
ance, with uncertainties of how the work of software developers is funded.63 Developers 
" Tezos is coded in OCaml. " Frankel (n 40), 11. 00 ibid. 
•• David Floyd, 'S6.3 Billion: 2018 !CO Funding Has Passed 2017's Total' (CoinDe.sk, 19 April 2018) bttps:// 
www.coindesk.com/6-3-billion-2018-ico-funding-already-outpaced-2017 /. 
" See De Nikhilesh, "SEC Halts Mayweather-Endorsed !CO, Charges Founders with Fraud' (CoinDe.sk, 2 April 
2018) bttps://www.coindesk.com/sec-ha1ts-mayweather-endorsed-ico-charges-founders-fraud/. 
•• Walch, 'Open-Sourced Operational Risk' (n 11 ), 256-59. 
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must spend significant time and effort gaining credibility and respect for their competence 
in order to be granted 'commit access' rights. Yet, as discussed in section IIIC, the mech­
anics of compensation for these efforts are uncertain and evolving, with no established 
way of paying developers for their extensive time and effort. A recent example of this 
phenomenon occurred in the Zcash public blockchain when a key developer threatened 
ta quit working on Zcash wallet software (for which he was the sole maintainer and which 
could potentially affect thousands of users) and to create a competing blockchain because 
he was not being paid for his work, resulting in money quickly being contributed to the 
developer.•• 
. .. 
Once we acknowledge that certain developers resemble fiduciaries, even if there is not 
a perfect likeness, the instincts that people have had all along make sense. For instance, 
there has been discussion about the need for increased transparency from the Ethereum 
Foundation, which apparently funds development of Ethereum, but provides very little 
public information about its structure, governance, or funding.•• This instinct towards 
transparency suggests that the developers realize that they are acting on behalf of others 
and owe those they represent transparency about their actions. There have been comments 
from key developers that indicate they appreciate the heavy responsibility they bear to 
keep the blockchain running.•• Recently, one of six core developers of Ethereum software 
resigned from his role because he was concerned about personal legal risk. •1 Finally, dis­
cussions about the compensation of core developers and commentary about conflicts of 
interest suggest that some have recognized the power certain developers exercise in rela­
tion to users_.. 
If certain people are functioning as fiduciaries, the question becomes 'What do we war 
to do about it?' From a policy perspective, there are clear arguments that those who a< 
as fiduciaries should be legally accountable as fiduciaries. However, treating these par 
ties as fiduciaries with concomitant liability would go against our existing liability frame­
work for software systems, which generally enables those who create software to cilsclaim 
liabilities for its flaws or harms it causes•• and has been resistant to characterizing those 
creating, designing, or building software as professionals subject to claims of professional 
malpractice. 7° 
" Rachel o·Leary, 'Zcash Pays Off Develop,r to Avoid Blockchain Split' (CoinD,sk, 22 June 2018) https://www. 
coindesk.com/zcash-pays-off-angry-developer-avoid-blockchain-split/. 65 See Ethereum Foundation Website, https://ethereum.org/foundation. ltlists three members of the Ethereum 
foundation but provides no information concerning governance, funding, or relationship to Ethereum software 
development. For discussion of lack of transparency, see Bob Summerwill, Tweets on Ethereum Foundation 
opacity (Twitt,r, 29 December 2017) https://twitt,r.com/BobSummerwill/status/946760015322398720. These 
statt: that ' there is no public list of who works for the Ethereum Foundation. There is no list of the projects 
which the Foundation funds or how much it funds them. There is no public information on the governance of 
the EF ... There is no pubLic information on the legal entities within or funded by the EF. There is no public 
information on the composition of the board of the EF or voting structure. There is no public information on 
who advis,s the EF.' 
" See Jonas SchneUi (Bitcoin core developer), Tweets (Twitter, 15 November 2017) hnps://twiner.com/_ 
jonasschnell.i_lstatus/930680174697381888: •4 developers have currently commit access: @orionwl @pwuille@ 
MarcoFalke and myself. It's a burden. It's for those who are willing to review and test code and keep up with the 
-80 github comments per day. It's not always fun and it's certainly not a privilege.' 
'" Rachel O'Leary, 'Ethereum Developer Resigns as Code Editor Citing Legal Concerns' (CoinD�lc.. IS February 
2018) https://www.coindesk..com/ethere um-developer-resigns ·as-code-editor-citing-legal-concerns/. 111 See nn 33 and 34. 
° For a recent overview of the 'unusual liability cocoon' that software vendors enjoy, see Marian Reidy and 
Bartlomiej Hanus, 'It is Just Unfair Using Trade Laws to Out S,curity Software Vulnerabiliti,s' (2017) 48 Loyola 
University Chicago Law Journal, 1111-14. 
" Mkhael D. Scott, Scott on Information Technology Law (3rd edn, 2nd Supplement, Aspen 2018), S,ction 
15.091A]: 'whether computer designers or programmers are professionals in the legal sense is still an open question: 
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IV. Costs and Benefits of Fiduciary Characterization
Although there are many ways that dominant developers resemble fiduciaries, the analysis 
here would be incomplete without considering the costs and benefits of such a categorization. 
In this section, I provide an initial sketch of these costs and benefits (in a non-quantitative 
sense) and leave exhaustive exploration of them to future work. 
A. Benefits
The benefits of the fiduciary categorization go back to the roots of the fiduciary relation­
ship: society gains when people can enter into relationships of trust, knowing that the trusted 
party has certain underlying obligations to them. These benefits include: 
I. ensuring that the fiduciary takes the performance of his or her services seriously, and, 
thus, performs them with deliberation and care; 
2. reducing harms caused by people, on whom others rely, acting without care or compe­
tence, or exploiting those that rely on them; 
3. increasing efficiency and economic activity due to a reduction in the investigation and 
due diligence that has to be done before every transaction with a fiduciary"-if one 
has fiduciary duties, the entrustor does not have to exhaustively research the person 
before entering into a transaction with him or her; 
4. the creation of an accountability standard that matches the seriousness of the services 
performed by the fiduciary. 
Connecting these benefits more closely with public blockchains, characterizing certain de­
velopers as fiduciaries would theoretically have the following impacts. 
(a) Developers would seriously consider the consequences of their policy and tech­
nical choices, obtain advice from expert sources when needed and use great care in 
drafting and reviewing code and all other actions they take whilst acting on behalf of 
the blockchain. 
(b) Greater care would result in better decisions by developers, about both conflicts of 
interest and substantive coding matters, meaning that those relying on the blockchain 
would likely be harmed less. 
(c) Less particularized due diligence of individual developers would be needed by those 
relying on the blockchain, meaning users would not have to keep track of the current 
cast of developers and do exhaustive research on each one in an ongoing evaluation 
of continued participation in the blockchain. This would minimize the resources 
needed to evaluate participation in the blockchain, which, in turn, would increase 
efficiencies. 
(d) There would be an acknowledgement that certain developers are making high-stakes 
decisions on critical matters, such as finance and money, on behalf of others and 
so are accountable in a way that more closely approximates the stakes involved. (As 
mentioned in the concluding paragraph of section III, it is notoriously difficult to 
hold anyone liable for problems caused by software, in part due to the 'economic loss' 
rule in tort law and in part because software licenses generally disclaim all liability for 
anything related to the software.) 72 
71 Franul (n 40), 271-72. " S.e Reidy and Hanus (n 69). 
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B. Costs
Of course, there are reasons not to view any developers as fiduciaries, many of which are 
commonly made against the idea of regulation itself. 
1. The primary argument against categorizing certain developers as fiduciaries is that the 
categorization could inhibit innovation. If these parties have to be worried about the 
effects that their actions would have on others, this will stifle their creativity and hold 
back development in the area because people will be afraid to try things that might go
wrong. It is too early to intervene in the development of blockchain technology. 
2. We need not worry about the governance of public blockchains because they are 'plat­
form' technologies and legal intervention is only appropriate at the application level or 
with intermediaries, such as wallet companies or exchanges. 
3. A fiduciary characterization is too extreme and too high a duty to place on these people. 
It would not be fair to treat them as fiduciaries based on what they are doing here. 
4. Given the large pool of potential beneficiaries who will have differing interests, it
would be impossible to tell when developers have met the fiduciary standard. A more
general duty to the public owed by certain developers may be more appropriate for 
these public infrastructural technologies. 
5. Treating certain developers as fiduciaries could deter them from participating in what 
may be socially beneficial projects as they will fear potential liability. 
6. Protecting those who rely on public blockchains through a fiduciary categorization is 
paternalistic and discourages people from doing proper due diligence when evaluating 
their participation in public blockchains. This discourages self-reliance and personal 
accountability in decision making.
7. It would be unfair to set such a high standard for developers as participants in th est 
public blockchains may not have had such accountability expectations when they de­
cided to participate. 
8. Developers are not compensated at a level consistent with the high accountability 
standard of a fiduciary. If their accountability risks increase, they will demand more 
money to provide the services. 
9. Too little is at stake now with public blockchains to bother with a fiduciary standard of 
performance by developers. 
Perhaps, in the end, the costs of the fiduciary categorization to innovation are balanced in 
the aggregate by the harms that are avoided by, and investigations that entrustors would 
otherwise have to do before, relying on the fiduciary's actions. Further research in this do­
main would be useful. 
V. Sorting Out the Details
To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To 
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he 
failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from his 
duty7" 
As Justice Frankfurter noted in SEC v. Chenery Corp. in 1943, one does not conclude an ana­
lysis by simply stating that a party is a fiduciary." For any given public blockchain, a tailored 
" SEC v. Chenery C,,rp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), 85-86. 74 ibid. 
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evaluation would be necessary to determine whether a particular developer is acting as a 
fiduciary. 
In this section, I identify some of the nuances and practical matters that would need to 
be considered and resolved if a legislature or a court were evaluating whether to treat par­
ticular software developers of a public blockchain as fiduciaries. In some instances, I suggest 
appropriate resolutions but further work beyond the scope of this short chapter is necessary 
to draw firmer conclusions. 
A. Who are the fiduciaries? 
I have suggested that certain developers resemble fiduciaries in their role in public 
blockchains but this does not resolve the question. It seems problematic to consider any and 
every software developer who participates in blockchain code development to be a fiduciary 
as only a small subset (probably including the core developers) actually determine what 
makes it into the released code. Similarly, it would be problematic to focus solely on those 
who craft the code, ignoring those who may determine the policy choices to be reflected in 
the code, which is why I have incorporated these types of parties into my use of the term 
'developer' in this chapter." In a spectrum of 'fiduciary-ness', those developers who make 
the most decisions on behalf of others look a lot like fiduciaries, while those who occasion­
ally make code proposals do not. Fiduciary developers would likely include developers who 
initially design and/or launch the system, those involved in decision making around new 
releases of software, including policy and technical choices as well as code review, and those 
who make decisions about how to address a crisis faced by the system (e.g. a critical bug or 
an attack on the system). 
B. Who are the entrustors? 
Thus far, I have been somewhat vague about who, precisely, are the parties to whom key de­
velopers would act as fiduciaries. In Frankel's parlance, who are the 'entrustors'? 
There are a variety of parties who inhabit a blockchain ecosystem. In addition to the 
software developers and miners already identified, there are owners of the native tokens 
(cryptocurrencies) of a blockchain (e.g. bitcoins and ether), businesses that service those 
who own and trade in cryptocurrencies (exchanges, wallets, payment processors, finan­
ciers), and companies that are using the underlying blockchain as a platform for other forms 
of recordkeeping, such as trading or property records. All of these parties rely on the suc­
cessful ongoing operation of the relevant public blockchain. In the future, a wider swath of 
the public could unknowingly rely on the operation of public blockchains, if they become 
part of underlying recordkeeping infrastructures that are not seen by the public. 76 Further, 
as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other tokens are now being described as 'crypto-assets' with fi­
nancial products like futures being tied to them, the holders of these cryptocurrency-based 
financial products also rely on developers. 
The trick here will be to determine which of these groups are considered 'entrustors' and 
entitled to the protections of, and obligations imposed by, fiduciary duties. Users of the 
applicable cryptocurrency appear to have the most reliance on the blockchain, but there 
are arguments that the other businesses within the ecosystem do as well. Ultimately, the 
fact that the public could be impacted if public blockchains become infrastructure, or if 
cryptocurrencies become systemically important to the financial system, may mean that 
n Seen4. 
•• There is much discu'5ion about how blockchains will ultimately just be invisible to the public, much as the 
internet infrastructure is largely opaque to the public now. 
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these fiduciary duties run to the public at large, similar to how certified public accountants 
are obligated to act to 'serve the public interest [and] honor the public trust'" or perhaps 
through the common law doctrine of public trust, which 'imposes on governing bodies fidu­
ciary duties toward the public'.'" With much discussion of how public blockchains are analo­
gous to sovereign entities, 79 the doctrine of public trust may also be a useful lens through 
which to view their governance processes.•• A full spelling-out of these arguments is beyond 
the scope of this chapter but is an important area for further research. 
C. What are the duties owed?
As Justice Frankfurter noted, we must ask what obligations one owes as a fiduciary. Again, 
deeper analysis is merited but the basic fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are a good starting 
point. Since leading developers look a lot like officers or directors of a corporation (if one views 
tokens as shares of stock in the corporation) having analogous fiduciary duties may make sense. 
A more fulsome analysis would look at whether the protections of the 'business judgment rule' 
used in the corporate setting would be appropriate here.81 
The duties of care and loyalty fall in neatly with the fiduciary definition provided by Frankel 
above. As discussed in section III, both competence (as part of the duty of care) and acting on 
behalf of the entrustor rather than oneself (as part of the duty of loyalty) are expectations that 
leading developers are probably already trying to live up to, and blockchain users expect them 
to uphold. 
D. How might fiduciary status of developers arise?
Perhaps the most difficult question to answer around the fiduciary characterization is how 
exactly the status would arise. As Frankel has noted, 'one cannot find a clear answer to 
the question of whether a relationship is fiduciary'. 82 Yet software developers and public 
blockchain advocates are quick to point to the open-source software licenses under which 
public blockchain software is issued, which generally disclaim liability for any claims arising 
from the software. 83 Furthermore, foundations associated with public blockchains may sep­
arately attempt to disclaim liability for claims related to the blockchain for the foundation 
" American Institute of CPAs Code of Conduct, Section ET 53 Article II https://www.aicpa.org/research/ 
standards/codeofconduct.hUnl. 71 See Frankel (n 40), 36 ('in the case of professional services, entrustors may include not only panicular per­
sons or groups but also the public and society'), 36-37 ('The fiduciary relationship of financial intermediaries may 
sometimes include a relationship to the financial system'), and 125. 
" See Marcella Atzori, 'Blockchain Technology and Decentralized Governance: Is the State Still Necessary?' 
(2017) 6 Journal of Governance and Regulation, 45, who analyses claims of blockchains to represent new forms of 
governance as alternatives to sovereign states: Sarah Mansk.i and Ben Mansk.i, 'No Gods, No Masters, No Coders? 
The Future of Sovereignty in a Block.chain World' (2018) 29 Law Critique, 151. who discuss claims of sovereignty 
around blockchains. 
" See Frankel (n 40), 279-87 for a discussion of government officials' fiduciary duties to the public. See also 
Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, and Michael Serota, 'Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law' (2013) 126 
Harvard Law Review Forum, 91, for an overview of the 'burgeoning field' of'fiduciary poHtical theory: 
11 The fluctuating scrutiny of directors' actions in .corporate law depending on the significance of the event 
may have resonance for developer fiduciary status. Director actions receive enhanced scrutiny when they re­
late to facilitating or fending off a change of control, for instance, which is analogous to a hard fork in a public 
block.chain. See Revlon Inc v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A 3d 173 (Delamere 1986); Unocal C-Orp. 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A 2d 946 (Delamere 1985). Carla Reyes notes this analogy in a draft paper, Carla 
Reyes, 'Corporate Crypto Governance' (26 January 2018) Blockchain Works-in-Progress Workshop, at Cardozo 
Law School. 
" Frankel (n 40), 77. 
" See, e.g., MIT License, https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT; GNU General Public License, https://www.gnu. 
org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html. 
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and any software developers employed by or contracted with the foundation.•• One could 
argue that any potential liability as a fiduciary is already disclaimed so there is little point in 
discussing the matter further. 
However, the presence of legal disclaimers in these documents does not resolve the ques­
tion. Fiduciary duties can arise in a number of ways-by contract, by statute,"' by acting as a 
fiduciary in the eyes of a court, or by status. Indeed, there is an ongoing debate in fiduciary 
law over whether fiduciary categorization is based solely on contract (and may be contracted 
out of by the parties) or whether there are situations in which fiduciary status arises by virtue 
of relationship or status and may not be disclaimed."' 1his has implications for the treatment 
of developers in public blockchains. 
If one views fiduciary status as being purely contract-based, then one could argue that a 
broad liability disclaimer and failure to affirmatively create a fiduciary relationship by con­
tract would mean no fiduciary status or liability could attach to a developer. One may at­
tempt to argue that the contract between users and developers implies a fiduciary status"' 
but it may be difficult to persuade a court of such. However, there is no certainty that the 
open-source software licenses will be enforced88 and there are questions about which par­
ticular parties would be bound to the licenses. Not all owners of bitcoins, ether, or other 
cryptocurrencies actually run the software themselves and many may never see the related 
open-source software license. They may obtain their cryptocurrencies through intermedi­
aries, like exchanges, or they may be exposed to what happens to cryptocurrencies through 
derivatives like futures contracts or investment funds. 1his raises questions about whether a 
given user of a cryptocurrency was on notice of the license terms and is, therefore, bound to 
them. Overall, though, it could be difficult to show that a fiduciary relationship was estab­
lished by contract between developers and entrustors (whoever those entrustors are). 
However, we may not need to show a contract establishing a fiduciary relationship for de­
velopers to be treated as fiduciaries, and even if the liability disclaimers around the software 
are upheld, they may not apply to breach of fiduciary claims.•• A court could view devel­
opers to be acting as fiduciaries, due to the characteristics identified in section Ill, and be 
willing to treat them as such. Courts are generally reluctant to create new types of fiduciaries 
but it does happen, often over a period of time.'° Frankel has identified spouses, mediators, 
... See, e.g., Ethereum Legal Agreement, (ethereum.org), https:/Jwww.ethereum.org/agreement, which disclaims 
liability for both the Ethereum Foundation and software developers employed by or contracted with the Ethereum 
Foundation. 
" For example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERJSA) 29 USC J002(2l)(A) statute 
deems certain parties to be fiduciaries. 
111 For the contractarian view, see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, 'Contract and Fiduciary Duty' 
(1993) 36 Journal of Law and Economics, 425; Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein, 'Opting Out of Fiduciary 
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians' (1993) 65 Washington Law Revit'w, 1. For the anti-contractarian 
view and a summary of the contract/status debate, see Frankel (n 40), 229-39. 
17 See DirkZetzsche, Ross Buckley, and Douglas Arner, 'The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal 
Risk, of Blockchain' (2018) University of 11/inois Law Review, 1392~96, which analyses contract-based claims 
against parties involved with public blockr:hains, including developers. 
11 There has been little case law around the enforceability of open-source software licenses (and their liability 
disclaimers) thus far. 
" See Northeast Gen. Corp. v. Wellington Adv., 82 NY 2d 158, 172. Hancock, J., dissenting: 'It is fundamental 
that a fiduciary duty "is not dependent solely upon an agreement or contractual relation between the fiduciary and 
the beneficiary but results from the relation.' See Deborah DeMott, 'Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation' ( 1988) Duke Law Journal, 887: 'contractual obligations are controlled by the parties' manifest intention; 
fiduciary obligation sometimes operates precisely in opposition to intention as manifest in express agreements. 
The terms of an express agreement are surely not irrelevant to the fiduciary obligation analysis, but once a court 
concludes that a particular relationship has a fiduciary character, the parties' manifest intention does not control 
their obligations to each other as dispositively as it does under a contract analysis.' 
'° See Lash " Cheshir< County Savings Bank, 474 A 2d 980 (NH 1984), wbich found a fiduciary relationship 
between a bank official and a bank customer in connection with confidential information entrusted by the cus­
tomer to the official despite no explicit contractual agreement regarding the fiduciary nature of the relationship: 
Martinelli Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diowan Corp., 10 F Supp 2d 138 (D Conn 1998), which found a fiduciary 
relationship between a church and its parishioner based on 'an approach (of examining] the power relationship 
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and mortgage brokers among others, as emerging fiduciaries," and more recently, Jonathan 
Zittrain and Jack Balkin have proposed treating tech companies who hold personal data as 
'information fiduciaries'.92 As I have argued throughout this chapter, there are many reasons 
why courts might be willing to view certain developers of public blockchains as fiduciaries, 
including the superior expertise and skill needed for public blockchain software design and 
development," as well as the fact that public blockchains purport to embed and transfer 
value (cryptoassets or cryptocurrencies) for an entire blockchain system, thereby making 
developers' actions highly consequential for potentially large numbers of people. 
Finally, developers could be deemed fiduciaries of a public blockchain by statute. With 
virtually every law-making body and regulatory agency worldwide considering how to treat 
blockchain technology and cryptoassets/cryptocurrencies, this is not an impossibility. As 
developers continue to take fiduciary-type actions within public blockchains and with the 
current questioning over power and ethics in the tech sector generally such a statutory des­
ignation becomes more likely. 
E. How would a breach of duty be identified?
Identifying a breach of duty here would be challenging but perhaps no more challen­
ging than it is in other complex tort problems. One of the primary challenges would be 
establishing that a particular action caused harm. It can be hard to identify which lines of 
code cause a problem as there are complex interactions that occur in the running of the soft­
ware. Even once the problematic code is located, it may be difficult to pin it to a particular 
developer. What happens if a portion of code is fine until a later update makes it problem­
atic? Furthermore, what happens if a core developer recommends a hard fork that turns out 
to do great damage to the blockchain and its users? 
Presumably, if such a fiduciary standard existed, those subject to the standard would 
document their investigation of issues and the rationale for their decisions, much like law­
yers regularly do. This type of behaviour would help to demonstrate that the fiduciary had 
fulfilled its responsibilities. Of course, taking action to avoid liability arguably leads to 
wasted efforts demonstrating compliance with the standard and could steal time from more 
productive use. However, a good amount of documentation around the process of proposing 
and evaluating changes to software code is a common part of open-source software develop­
ment through sites like GitHub, so there may be few significant changes required in practice. 
F. What are the consequences of a breach of the duty?
The consequences of a breach of such a fiduciary duty would arguably be that the 'entrustors' 
( whichever parties are deemed to fall in that bucket) would have a cause of action against 
the fiduciaries for the breach.94 This means that fiduciary developers could, depending on 
who is deemed an entrustor, be subject to liability claims from an enormous number of 
people-users of the applicable cryptocurrency, potentially along with businesses building 
and its potential for abuse: For a discussion on how courts recognize new types of fiduciaries, see Frankel (n 40). 
220-22. 
" Frankel (n 40), 53-58. 
" JackM. Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain, 'A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy' (The Atlantic, 
3 October 2016) https:/ /www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/ I Of information -fiduciary/502346/. 
" Destefanis et al. (n 49). 
,.. Claims for breach of fiduciary duty are sometimes treated as tort claims and other times as contract claims, 
with a wide variety of remedies possible. Depending on the situation, monetary damages (compensatory or puni­
tive), equitable remedies (like injunctions), rescission, or disgorgement of any profits made by the fiduciary as part 
of breaching the duty, may be available. See Dan Dobbs, Paul Hayden, and Ellen Bublick, Dobbs' Law of Torts, (2nd 
edn, Thomson West, June 2017 update), Section 699. 
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on and servicing the blockchain. Despite any cryptocurrency that they may have previously 
managed to cash out, it would likely be very difficult for any of these fiduciary developers to 
satisfy their liabilities-the cost of making whole an entire blockchain would simply be too 
great. This situation-the fact that the economic (or other) harms caused by parties deemed 
fiduciaries may be too great for them to cover-could cast doubt over whether the fiduciary 
categorization is worthwhile, if the entrustors are unlikely to ever be made whole. 
Working out the consequences of a breach of fiduciary duty may lead to varying proposals, 
such as requiring some sort of malpractice insurance or directors' and officers' (D&O) insur­
ance or bond for those with the fiduciary duties, or requiring a certification or licensure to 
engage in high-stakes, high-trust positions like those of leading developers. Indeed, a recent 
computer science paper called for a higher standard of software engineering for blockchain 
software development, given its particularly difficult nature and the high stakes involved 
with errors."' 
Potential for liability claims may also incentivize developers to form a more traditional 
legal organizational structure for a public blockchain, such as a corporation or limited li­
ability company. (Of course, adopting a traditional legal structure goes fundamentally 
against the core ideal of decentralized governance in public blockchain systems.) 
G. Could a fiduciary standard be enforced? 
Many who work with public blockchains do so based on an ideology of libertarianism or 
even anti-government or anarchic beliefs. Escaping government altogether through the 
technology is of great significance; a duty does not have any bite unless it is able to be 
enforced. 
Enforcement of a fiduciary duty, when the fiduciaries are spread across the globe and per­
form their services from numerous different jurisdictions, would be complicated. Threading 
this needle would require recognition of the fiduciary relationship by the appropriate legal 
authorities as well as actually tracking down the people involved, some of whom may per­
form their services anonymously. Attempting to bring accountability to infrastructures on 
which the public relies could drive those wishing to avoid accountability further into the 
shadows. However, those who wish to legitimize the technology may be willing to step up 
and acknowledge the appropriateness of accountability in this area. 
Opinions diverge on whether nation states can actually hold parties operating public 
blockchain systems accountable."• The matter remains unsettled but states have been able 
to enforce laws in cyberspace so I would expect them to work out a way to do the same in 
'blockchain space'. 
As always, the devil is in the details and many questions still need answers before this issue is 
resolved. Most of the questions will not have clear answers; rather, they will require a careful 
balancing of costs and benefits, fairness, public policy concerns, etc. However, the inquiries 
remain worthwhile despite the challenges they present. 
VI. Ongoing Experiments in Governance and Accountability
The public blockchain world is incredibly fast-moving, with new blockchain systems con­
stantly being created and existing ones working to fix governance issues as they are revealed. 
A number of blockchain systems have now explicitly incorporated governance into their 
" Destefanis et al (n 49). 
" Defilippi and Wright (n 7), 181-83, discuss government regulation ofblockchain software developers and 
enforcement challenges. 
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designs from the outset; some of these new systems may structure the power of software 
developers differently than Bitcoin or Ethereum. Additionally, legal scholars, along with re­
searchers in the blockchain community, have begun to weigh in with initial analyses of and 
proposals for public blockchain governance. 
Tezos, 97 EOS, 91 Decred, •• and Dfinity'00 are examples of public blockchains using or plan­
ning to use alternative governance processes, with variations in the powers of validators in 
the network or how changes to software are made. After starting out eschewing the need for 
governance entirely, those working on public blockchain networks have recognized the crit­
ical role governance plays in a system's success.••• A field of study called 'cryptoeconomics' is 
being developed to design incentive structures intended to result in transaction processors 
providing security (resistance to attack) for a blockchain. '02 These 'consensus mechanisms' 
(or, rules for coming to agreement) for transaction processors play a significant role in the 
governance of public blockchain systems, indicating just how rich, complex, and nascent 
this area of study remains. 
Legal scholars have begun to grapple with the governance questions raised by public 
blockchains. For example, Philipp Hacker has proposed fitting a corporate governance 
framework onto blockchains. ••> Carla Reyes has proposed that a business trust may be 
a suitable form of legal entity for blockchain developers and other players in the system 
to take advantage of limited liability without having to formally create a corporation or 
limited liability company.••• Each of these analyses, in acknowledging the role that soft­
ware developers play in the governance process of public blockchains, implicitly acknow­
ledges that certain software developers fulfil roles of trust and power in public blockchain 
systems.••• 
All of this is to say that public blockchain governance and the theorizing around it re­
main works in progress. Nevertheless, 1 feel pretty comfortable predicting that systems 
based on software will continue to require software developers to create code (with all the 
processes, decisions, and judgement calls that are involved). (And yes, I hear those of you 
saying, 'But Al .. :). 
VII. Broader Implications and Concluding Thoughts
This chapter focuses on the behaviours of software developers in the public blockchain con­
text. They provide a neat example of a potentially new type of fiduciary acting in today's 
world and my hope is that this chapter opens the door to further research on the matter and 
also alerts regulators and policy makers to the need to press hard on the 'decentralized' repu­
tation of public blockchains. 
" Tezos website, https://tezos.com/. " EOS website, https://eos.io/. 
" Decred websil<. https://www.decred.org/. •00 Dfinity website, https:/ /dfinity.org/. 
101 See, e.g., Fred Ehrsam, 'Block.chain Governance: Programming Our Future' (Medium, 17 November 
2017) https://medium.com/@FEhrsam/bloclu:hain-governance-programming-our-future-c3bfe30f2d74; Vlad 
Zamfir, 'Against On-Chain Governance' (Medium, I December 2017) https://medium.com/@Ylad_Zamlir/ 
aga.inst•on•chain-governance-a4ceacd040ca. 
"' See Josh Stark. 'Making Sense of Cryptoeconorrucs (Medium, 28 August 2017) https://medium.com/14-
mediaJmaking-sense-of-cryptoeconomics-c6455776669. A helpful compilation of resources on cryptoeconomics 
is available at https:/ /github.com/jpantunes/awesome-cryptoeconomics. 
101 See Philip Hacker, chapter 7 in this volume. 
••• Carla Reyes, 'If Rockefeller Were a Coder' (forthcoming) 87 George Washington Law Review, https:/ /papers. 
ssrn.com/sol 3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id= 3082915. 
101 Other researchers have examined the potential liability of software developers of public blockchain sys­
tems. See Zetzsche et al. (n 87); Tim Swanson, 'Who are the Administrators of Blockchains?' (OjNumbers Blog, 
19 October 2017) http://www.ofnumbers.com/2017/10/ 19/who-are-the-administrators-of-blockchains/; Ciaran 
Murray, 'Aie Public Blockchain Systems Unlicensed Money Services Businesses In Disguise?' (Rule.s of the Game 
Blog. 12 October 2017) http:/ /rulesofthegame.blog/2017/10/12/are-public-bloclu:hain-systems-unlicensed­
money-services-businesses-in-disguise/. 
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We must be vigilant as to how our legal and social concepts need to change as our tech­
nologies and practices change. As we experiment in technology and with new methods of 
governance, our legal concepts need to expand to accommodate these experiments. It may 
be helpful to focus on the function and activities performed by a party, rather than on what 
they call themselves. If the developers had formed a corporation to launch and operate these 
public blockchains (rather than having separate foundations to pay developers), no one 
would question that the officers, directors, and controlling shareholders of that corporation 
had fiduciary duties in their leadership roles and that the corporation should be accountable 
for harms that it causes (like Volkswagen is accountable for its deceptive emissions code). 
Yet, we seem mystified by the nominally decentralized governance and unable to see that a 
spade is still a spade (is still a fiduciary). 
Blockchain technology has jumped into the deep end very early in its life. The functions 
that its proponents expect it to perform are critical, infrastructural functions in our soci­
eties. As coding becomes infrastructure building and maintenance, it is very much akin to 
building bridges, or nuclear reactors, or national security structures. And those building 
and maintaining and making decisions about these core infrastructures must take what they 
are doing seriously. Blockchain developers must recognize that they are not just building 
fun technology like Wikipedia or Napster, where a system failure has few significant social 
consequences. 
Furthermore, it is insufficient to focus exclusively on the companies building on top of 
public blockchains. 1his approach ignores the people involved in creating and running the 
network upon which others are building. The foundations of this new infrastructure are 
being built by people, people who are malting decisions that will impact the operation and 
success of the new infrastructure. It takes a great deal of expertise to successfully implement 
these decisions, much less to make the policy choices that the implementation reflects. These 
are not simply technical decisions being made-there are also, inevitably, policy choices, risk 
assessments, economic decisions, and ethical judgements happening. 
The bottom line is that trust in particular, identifiable people remains fundamental to 
using 'trustless' public blockchains. The crucial question is-are we willing to acknowledge 
its existence? 
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